Introduction
Genocide is no ordinary crime. It has been labeled as "contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations" and as "an odious scourge," in the Preamble to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNTS 1951: 278) , hereinafter referred to as "the Genocide Convention" or "the Convention", as well as "the ultimate human rights problem" and "the crime of all crimes" (Schabas 2009: 7, 15) . Whilst most human rights conventions and declarations relate to the individual's right to life, the Genocide Convention is concerned with human groups' right to life. Resolution 96(I) adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1946 draws this group versus * The authors of this article express their gratitude to the Editor of Journal of Human Rights -Professor Shareen Hertel -and two anonymous reviewers for very thorough and constructive feedback on an earlier version of the text.
individual rights comparison in most clear terms: "Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of humankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations" (United Nations 1947a).
Nearly seventy years since its adoption, the Genocide Convention has been the subject of litigation between states and criminal prosecution of individuals before a number of international courts and tribunals such as the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as "the ICJ" or "the Court"), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter referred to as "the ICTR"), and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as "the ICTY"). There are other international courts and tribunals currently seized of genocide cases which have not yet been determined. Such is the case of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the "ICC"). The same applies equally to national courts, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Ciorciari and Heindel 2014) .
However, notwithstanding the institution of these cases, few and far between have been those instances where an international court or tribunal has found that genocide has been perpetrated by an individual and virtually never by a state. Indeed, judgements delivered so far by international courts and tribunals with regard to the application of the Genocide Convention indicate that genocide has been found to have been committed in only a limited number of cases. In so far as the ICTR is concerned, there have been few such occasions when compared to victims' suffering the first two landmark decisions being: ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, 2000; and ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 2001 . At the end of June 2016, the ICTY had determined four genocide decisions: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, 2004; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al, 2015; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, 2015; and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, 2016 . Whilst the ICJ, todate, has delivered only one genocide judgement, namely the It is puzzling that although genocide is a collective crime against groups inconceivable without the involvement of the state, indeed considered as the archetypical crime of the state, no government involved in the commission of genocide has to-date been held responsible for this heinous crime. Whilst individual responsibility for genocide has been established for a handful of perpetrators, the state on whose behalf they operated has not bore the brunt of its criminal enterprise. The Genocide Convention imposes some obligations upon states but it does not provide explicitly that states may be held responsible for the crime of crimes. The centrepiece of the genocide law, the Genocide Convention, posited from a criminal justice perspective, is concernedprimarily -with prosecution of individual perpetrators rather than their master sponsor, their government. It was hoped that state responsibility for genocide would be finally discharged in the latest judgement decided by the ICJ (Bosnia v. Serbia). However, this was not the case. Indeed, as shown below, the provisions of the Convention and its technical interpretation afforded by the Court disadvantaged the victim state. Coupled with the legal culture of the Court which is more reverential to the doctrine of state sovereignty rather than to emphasize the state's assumption of responsibility for atrocities committed, these drawbacks are contributing to the Genocide Convention losing its efficacy.
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
The second aspect of the "puzzle" or problematique of this paper concerns how the ICJ's legal process conditions the (quality of) decisions taken by the Court. The paper considers specifically the ICJ genocide cases with a view to shedding light on the limitations inherent in the Convention as well as in the ICJ's legal culture that are contributing to make the infliction of punishment for genocide more difficult to achieve. 
State Responsibility for Genocide
The concept of "state responsibility" has a fascinating history connected directly with the formation of the United Nations and UN discussions on the text of the Genocide Convention which makes clear the political and legal intricacies inherent in the term.
Before referring below to those discussions, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by "state" in the context of this contribution. At first glance it may not appear obvious that there is an ambiguity pertaining to the definition of state itself because in the wide use of the term in various disciplines such as political science, law, sociology, history etc., this word is frequently taken for granted. Given its centrality to various disciplines it is not surprising that its meaning may vary depending on the nature of the research question and the context of analysis. In general, there are two broad conceptions of state: a nationalterritorial concept according to which the state comprises the whole territory denoted on a map and all which is within it (people, government, resources); and a more limited, institutional concept of state. While both conceptions are heuristic abstractions, the most appropriate in the context of our analysis is the second, that is, the institutional conception of the state. Hence, with Theda Skocpol, we understand "state" to mean: "a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated, by an executive authority" (Skocpol 1979: 29 Internationally Wrongful Acts, the words "state crime" do not feature at all, though James Crawford maintains that there exist international crimes such as aggression and genocide "which are committed mainly or only by State agencies" (Crawford 2002: 19) .
Nonetheless, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts ( As the history of the debate on state responsibility in the process of drafting the Genocide Convention reviewed above shows, although the state has been considered to be the main perpetrator of genocide, the Convention does not make explicit that commission of that crime entails state responsibility, complicity, or involvement. The ICJ, nevertheless, has finally ruled that states may commit genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Genocide Convention, and therefore incur the responsibility for this crime (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 168-169, 174 and 471, sub-para. (5)). Moreover, the Court has stated that it "will have recourse not only to the Convention itself, but also to the rules of general international law ... on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts" (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 149) . In many ways this is a landmark pronouncement that raises hopes for attribution of state responsibility for genocide, although these hopes did not fully materialize in the judgements referred to in this analysis.
In legal parlance "responsibility" is frequently used interchangeably with It is only in the massacre of Srebrenica of July 11-19, 1995 -where more than 7,000
Bosnian Muslim man and boys were killed by the Serb forces -that genocidal intent can be discerned the Court found. Hence, the Srebrenica massacre was qualified as genocide. obligation sustained, and -in all probability -the injury suffered would be irremediable.
Ambiguities Related to, and Limitations in, the Definition of Genocide
This paper contributes to an emerging debate on the application of state responsibility The Court was also asked as to whether the extermination of the group was required to which it ruled that it was difficult to establish the genocidal intent "on the basis of isolated acts" (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 139) and that there had to be destruction of "the group itself in whole or in part" (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 139) . As to what constitutes the meaning of destruction of the group "in part" as opposed to "in full", the Court opined that the targeted part of a protected group had to be "substantial in This is not to say that acts described as "ethnic cleansing" may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be characterized as, for example, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction "in whole or in part", contrary to Article II, paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from its removal from the region . . . In other words, whether a particular operation described as "ethnic cleansing" amounts to genocide depends on the presence or absence of acts listed in Article II of the Genocide Convention, and of the intent to destroy the group as such (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 190) .
Ethnic cleansing, contrary to genocide, cannot be prosecuted in its own right for international criminal law does not recognize an international crime of ethnic cleansing.
However, some of its constitutive elements may fall under sub-divisions of international criminal law such as crimes against humanity or war crimes and, where there is the genocidal intent, the actus reus of ethnic cleansing may fall under the crime of genocide despite the fact that the mens rea of ethnic cleansing does not.
Further, ethnic cleansing may, in certain situations, point towards the specific intent required to prove that genocidal acts have taken place. It is indeed here that international law appears to complicate matters for an applicant state before the ICJ attempting to obtain a declaration from the Court of state responsibility for genocide by the respondent state because, although it recognizes genocide as the crime of all crimes, international law fails to recognize ethnic cleansing as a separate and distinct crime in its own right rather than as an appendage to the crime of genocide or to other international crimes. In addition, although the Convention correctly penalizes genocide, it can be extremely difficult for the ICJ to attribute state responsibility for the crime of genocide, due to the doctrine of precedent adopted by the ICJ which requires it to adopt a high standard of proof to ground state responsibility for genocide, as explained in the following section. The contradiction thus lies in the fact that whilst genocide is an international crime, state perpetrators may run scot free on two counts: first, because the probative standard to meet it is too high and, second, because if genocide cannot be proved due to the high probative standard required by the ICJ from the applicant state, the said state cannot rely on the lesser offence of ethnic cleansing once the latter conduct does not, in itself, amount to an international or domestic crime, and the Genocide Convention does not allow the ICJ to find state responsibility for a lesser offence even if the Court finds in its judgment responsibility for such lesser offence but not for genocide.
Fourth, the actus reus of genocide has given rise to ambiguities in its interpretation which the ICJ has attempted to resolve. The Convention, in Article II, stipulates that the actus reus may take the form of five distinct and separate acts. The
Court has had occasion, in its case law, to interpret some of these genocidal acts.
Genocide is a collective crime in the sense that victims are part of a group defined, in the words of Article II of the Convention, as "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" certainty whether those individuals are dead, and if so, how they died, is capable of causing psychological suffering", but the said harm "must be such as to contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the group, in whole or in part" (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia, 2015: 160) . As to the genocidal act of "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part", the ICJ has held that this covers "physical destruction, other than killing, whereby the perpetrator ultimately seeks the death of the members of the group." (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 161) . It also considers forced displacements which take place "in such circumstances that they were calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group" (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 163) as falling under this genocidal act. Another genocidal act is "imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group" which the ICJ has interpreted to mean that "rape and other acts of sexual violence" constitute the actus reus of genocide, if "they are of a kind which prevents birth within the group. In order for that to be the case, it is necessary that the circumstances of the commission of those acts, and their consequences, are such that the capacity of members of the group to procreate is affected" (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia, 2015: 166) . Once Contracting Parties have raised these ambiguities in the interpretation of the actus reus of genocide and the ICJ has attempted to clarify the Convention, it would be appropriate if these clarifications are approved by the said Parties through specific amendment to the Convention to support and give more weight to the Court's interpretation.
Standard of Proof to Ground State Responsibility for Genocide
The standard of proof varies from one international court and tribunal to another. There is thus no consistency and uniformity in the standard of proof adopted by diverse international courts and tribunals. The ICJ follows a strict stare decisis approach and will not "depart from previous findings, particularly when similar issues were dealt with in its earlier decisions … unless it finds very particular reasons to do so" (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 125) . This means it is very difficult, not to say well-nigh impossible, for the Although this distinction is legally sound, the same cannot be said with regard to the standard of proof. Within a national court scenario, the standard of proof varies depending on the nature or subject-matter of the dispute. If the case is a criminal one, the standard of proof to be resorted to is proof beyond reasonable doubt; if the case is a civil one, the standard of proof resorted to is proof on a balance of probability. The criminal law standard is by far more stringent than that of civil law. Nonetheless, such stringency does make sense within a criminal law context as the punishment to be meted out can include, and normally would include in the case of conviction for the crime of genocide, deprivation of liberty through imprisonment. In a civil case, if a state is found to be responsible, normally reparations would have to be made good to the other state through the liquidation of damages. In the realm of international law, however, whilst international criminal courts and tribunals adopt the reasonable beyond doubt standard on the same lines as national criminal courts do, the International Court of Justice as an international civil court does not apply the standard of proof on a balance of probability but proof by fully conclusive evidence. Furthermore, the ICJ has not limited such proof to "conclusive evidence" but "proof by fully conclusive evidence." The standard of "proof by conclusive evidence" is already high let alone "proof by fully conclusive evidence."
Whilst "proof by conclusive evidence" might be equated to proof beyond reasonable doubt, "proof by fully conclusive evidence" requires a higher standard of proof which does not allow any doubt or uncertainty as to state responsibility.
The standard of proof by fully conclusive evidence, adopted by the Court in the 1949 Corfu Channel judgment, is neither established in the Genocide Convention, nor in the ICJ Statute. Instead it is entirely case law driven. Moreover, given that proving a case by the applicant state against the respondent state constitutes an onerous task, applying "proof by fully conclusive evidence" might serve as a disincentive for a state to bring a dispute against another state before the ICJ. The number of cases brought before the ICJ are indeed on the low side and perhaps the time has arrived to revisit the standard of proof in order to remove barriers for states to make better use of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. In short, the standard of proof related to genocide varies from one international court to another. As explained, the ICJ adopts the "evidence by fully conclusive standard of proof." But this is not the standard adopted before international judicial bodies such as the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC, which consistently adopt the proof beyond reasonable doubt standard. The latter has been defined by Lord Denning as follows:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence "of course it is possible but not in the least probable" the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice (KBD, Miller v. Ministry of Pensions 1947: 372) .
The inconsistency regarding standard of proof runs the risk of limiting the attribution of state responsibility for genocide.
Although the raising of the evidentiary bar setting extremely high standards of proof for genocide is characteristic of the ICJ, it is emulated by other international tribunals. As Gregory Kent observes when discussing the decisions of the ICTR and the ICTY: "in some cases, there are 'prosecutorial omissions and errors as well as a tendency on the part of the judges to require that the prosecution meet higher evidentiary standards in these cases than in other types of cases"' which are "illustrative of certain narrowing developments in case law" (Kent 2013: 573-574) . Furthermore Kent notes that "the idea,
in Bosnia at least, that a plan of action directed at the destruction of non-Serb groups needed further evidence to be proven beyond all reasonable doubt seems farcical to the victims and equally far-fetched to academic experts" (Kent 2013: 576) . Once more, an excessive standard of proof contributes directly to limiting attribution of responsibility for genocide.
Exclusions made by the Genocide Convention regarding Sources of International Law and Finding of State Responsibility for a Lesser Offence
First, Article 38 (1) Although such sources are not arranged in a hierarchical order, the first three sources of international law, that is, treaty law, custom and jus cogens are a primary source of international law whilst the other two sources (judicial decisions and the writings of publicists) are a subsidiary source of international law. In so far as the primary sources are concerned, they are of equal value and are not placed in a hierarchical order amongst themselves. Hence, it cannot be argued that treaty law is superior to both customary law and jus cogens and that customary law is, in turn, superior to jus cogens. In other words, all three sources are of equal weight although treaty law normally tends to be better ascertainable than the other two sources of international law.
Nonetheless, the international crime of genocide is perhaps one of those very few If the provisions of the Genocide Convention continue to make it difficult to attribute responsibility for the most heinous crime to a state, or violent group involved in its commission, this bodes worse for a state to implement its positive obligation to prevent genocide and negative obligation to punish this crime in order to safeguard the right of existence of human groups. Unless the Genocide Convention is amended, it will continue to be very difficult for the ICJ to condemn a state for its responsibility in the perpetration of genocide thereby reducing the effective deterrent for states which may elect to walk that atrocious criminal route. This paper has thus raised some concerns regarding interpretive and procedural deficiencies pertaining to the protection from the perpetration of genocide which deserve to be addressed in order to ensure that the worst crime known to humankind is punished with the full rigor of the law.
11 Genocide is an international crime because it has been so declared by the international community of states in an international treaty. Those states which have adhered to this treaty are in turn bound to incorporate this international crime in their national law, enforce it and punish it accordingly. 12 The predominant response to addressing disorder caused by operations of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) -so far -has been physical, military counter-force with the view of establishing order and an official monopoly of force. Virtually absent are law-related responses despite the fact that most VNSAs commit offences against all kinds of law, including those related to arms and the use of violence, and provisions on human and civil rights. To-date inability to target and "discipline" VNSAs by means of inter/national law not only leads to further spirals of lawlessness in so far as activities of these actors are concerned but may do deeper and longer-lasting damage than anything that the VNSAs may have inflicted directly. For a rare emphasis of this point refer to Bailes and Nord (2010: 441-466 ).
